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Abstract
Relying on a large foreign direct investment (FDI) transaction level dataset, unique
both in terms of disaggregation and time and country coverage, this paper examines
patterns in greenfield (GF) versus merger & acquisition (MA) investment. Although
both are found to seek out large markets with low international barriers, important dif-
ferences emerge. MA is more affected by geographic and cultural barriers and exhibits
opportunistic behaviours as it is more sensitive to short-run changes, such as a currency
crisis. On the other hand, GF is relatively driven by long-run factors, such as origin-
country technological and institutional development or comparative advantage. These
empirical facts are consistent with the conceptual distinction made between these two
modes, i.e. MA involves transfer of ownership for integration or arbitrage reasons while
GF relies on firms own capacities, which are linked to the origin countries attributes.
They also suggest that GF and MA are likely to respond differently to policies intended
to attract FDI.
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1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) occurs via two modes, greenfield (GF) investment and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (MA). The implicit distinction between the two modes is that
GF investment relies on the internal capabilities of the multinational enterprise (MNE), as
is most clearly embodied in the notion of building a new subsidiary from the ground up; MA
meanwhile involves transfer of ownership of an existing asset. Although there is widespread
recognition of the distinct nature of these modes, due to data constraints there is little
research actually comparing GF and MA FDI. Further, what does exist almost exclusively
relies on data for a single developed country. In addition, while it is generally presumed
that most worldwide FDI flows are MA (e.g. Globerman and Shapiro, 2004 or Head and
Ries, 2008), these statements rely on data during the 1990s and miss the remarkable growth
of primarily GF FDI in developing countries during the 2000s (UNCTAD, 2014). Thus,
there is a need for a study comparing GF and MA FDI using more recent data. This paper
fulfills that need by using a unique combined transaction-level dataset covering worldwide
GF and MA FDI for the period 2003-2010 across 37 manufacturing and services sectors.
This level of disaggregation has been heretofore unavailable and allows us to compare not
only the developed and developing country experiences but also the sectoral composition of
FDI modes.
We find that the two modes share several similarities. For example, both tend to come
from the developed countries and are affected by traditional “gravity” variables such as
GDP and distance. Similarly, both are dominated by manufacturing, although services form
a significant share of overall FDI flows and comprise the largest sectors within each mode.
Nevertheless, there are key differences across modes. While the developed countries receive
the majority of MAs, developing countries host the bulk of GF FDI. In addition, our count
data regression analysis shows that MA investment is more responsive to barriers between
the origin and destination countries, including investment cost and geographical and cultural
barriers. MA also features more opportunistic behaviour in that it is more sensitive to short-
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run variations such as changes in market size, changes in capital market depth, or a currency
crisis. In contrast, GF is far more sensitive to long-run factors, targeting more low-tax
locations and relying more on home technological development, quality of institutions, and
the degree of comparative advantage. These results are on the whole consistent with the
conceptual distinction made between the two modes; namely, that MA involves transfer of
ownership (arising from a desire to integrate or exploit arbitrage opportunities) whereas GF
relies more on a firm’s own capacities (which are intrinsically linked to the origin country’s
attributes).
An important aspect of our data is that unlike other studies, we can compare FDI between
developed countries (which dominates the data) with that going to and/or coming from
the South. Doing so is important because MA FDI is skewed towards developed countries
whereas GF is the opposite. Indeed, we find that differences between modes with respect
to variables such as distance between countries is in part driven by the different geographic
concentrations of the two modes of FDI. Similarly, by exploiting our sector data, we are
able to identify how differences between modes vary by industry. For example, although
manufacturing GF is less responsive to a common language than its MA counterpart, in
services, the two modes respond equally to a shared language.
Recognizing these differences is important to understanding the patterns of FDI and
therefore the policies that can be used to attract one type of investment relative to another.
This matters since the potential impacts of FDI can vary by mode. For example, as discussed
by Davies and Desbordes (forthcoming), outbound GF may have much stronger negative
effects on an origin country’s labour market than does MA. Thus, if a country experiences
FDI outflows due to falling tax rates elsewhere, our estimates suggest this would primarily
be in GF and therefore have larger than average labour market effects.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the existing literature on FDI with a
focus on that comparing the two modes of investment. Section 3 describes our data. Section
4 contains a set of stylized facts for the two modes, including a discussion of the primary
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origins, destinations, and sectors for MA and GF FDI. Section 5 expands on these stylized
facts by utilizing regression analysis to estimate where the two modes move in similar - and
in different - ways in response to origin, destination, and country pair characteristics. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Literature on FDI Mode
The literature on FDI is vast, covering models suggesting why FDI occurs, empirical studies
testing those models, analyses of the impacts of FDI, and suggestions on the management
of MNEs via government policy.1 Despite this plethora of papers, there is remarkably little
discussing both GF and MA FDI, either theoretically or empirically.2 In this section, we
describe this small body of research.
The theory on mode choice typically starts at the firm level, where an individual firm
chooses its entry mode accounting for the costs and benefits of each, a decision which can
then be included in a general equilibrium model. A prime example of this approach is Nocke
and Yeaple (2008) who provide a model in which a MNE establishes a subsidiary for two
reasons: lowering production costs and hiring new entrepreneurs who provide headquarter
services. While both modes seek lower production costs, only MA acquire new entrepreneurs
by purchasing an acquisition target whereas GF makes do with those it has in the origin
country.3 An implication of this is that, since a new entrepreneur is only beneficial to the firm
if her productivity exceeds that of the origin-country entrepreneur, firms with high origin
1For brevity, we do not attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the FDI literature and focus
only on what is most relevant to the comparison between GF and MA. See Navaretti and Venables (2006),
Blonigen (2005), and Blonigen and Piger (2011) for recent overviews of the broader literature on FDI.
2There are, however, many papers discussing one mode or the other. Examples of GF models include
Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984), and Helpman et al. (2004). Neary (2007) and Head and Ries (2008)
provide models where FDI is exclusively MA.
3For evidence on the choice of target, see Blonigen et al. (2012), and Guadalupe et al. (2012) who focus
on the characteristics of the target (so called “cherry picking”). Herger and McCorriston (2014) analyze
the linkages between the acquired and target firm via input-output tables, finding a large role for vertical
acquisitions and a surprisingly large share of acquisitions for which there are no obvious industrial linkages.
Ray (2014) compares the acquirer and target in product space. She shows that even in the absence of direct
linkages, multinationals acquire activities in industries relatively closely related to their own spectrum of
products.
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productivity are unlikely to gain from MA and therefore focus on GF.4 In addition, due to
complementarities between production and headquarter services, productive firms (and thus
GF firms) will dominate when there are large production cost differences (such as between
the developed North and less-developed South). On the other hand, North-North FDI will
be predominantly MA. Finally, the tradeoff between modes depends on their relative costs.
When targets in the destination are scarce, making MA costly, GF will naturally dominate.
Conversely, if the establishment of a GF subsidiary is more difficult, MA will dominate. The
authors then confirm these patterns using aggregated US outbound FDI.
A concurrent set of theories focuses on the price of MA as a crucial component in the
choice of whether to choose GF or MA. For example, Raff et al. (2009) provide a model
where the acquisition price is forward looking, i.e. where the potential target recognizes that,
should they charge a high acquisition price, this can lead to GF investment which increases
the number of firms and has consequences for their profits.5 Muller (2007) provides a model
in which changes in competition feed into the acquisition price and shows that it depends on
the extent of existing competition in the country. In particular, GF FDI will be preferred
when there are either few or many firms; MA FDI will dominate under moderate competition.
Note that in contrast to Nocke and Yeaple (2008), the tradeoff in this line of research is less
about the transfer or acquisition of technology but more about changes in competition.
The empirical work on mode choice also has two main themes. The first looks at the choice
of mode for a given firm using a discrete dependent variable methodology. For example,
Drogendijk and Slangen (2006) use survey data from Dutch MNEs to focus on the role of
cultural distance in the mode choice, finding that greater cultural barriers tend to encourage
GF over MA. Other examples can be found in the survey of the business literature provided
by Slangen and Hennar (2007). As they discuss, of the results that are consistent across
studies, MA dominate in wealthier targets (consistent with Nocke and Yeaple, 2008) whereas
4In a related paper Nocke and Yeaple (2007) show that this productivity ranking, and hence the impact of
country characteristics, can depend on whether the firm productivity differences relates to the international
mobility of its production characteristics.
5Other papers focusing on the acquisition price include Go¨rg (2000) and Buckley and Casson (1998).
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GF dominates when cultural differences are large. A difficulty with all of this work, however,
is that these studies typically only use data on the outbound FDI of a single country (with
the exceptions being data on inbound FDI to a single destination or for a very small number
of countries). As suggested by Slangen and Hennar (2007), this, along with the lack of a
consistent set of regressors across studies, may drive the general lack of consistent findings.
The second strand of empirical literature uses aggregated FDI (typically at the country
level). Perhaps the most utilized data for this is that provided by UNCTAD (2014), which
produces annual reports documenting the world-wide and regional patterns of GF and MA
FDI. Using these data in a cross-section, Globerman and Shapiro (2004) compare how FDI
inflows and outflows vary with gravity variables (measures of market size and trade and
investment costs) for both the full and MA only samples.6 They find that all FDI is attracted
to larger economies, with MA particularly so. In addition, drawing from the literature
looking exclusively at MA FDI, they control for a variety of institutional and financial depth
measures, again finding that MA is typically more sensitive to these factors than is overall
FDI.7 Neto et al. (2009) extend this analysis to a panel and include cultural variables,
finding that they appear to be more important for GF than MA.8 Park et al. (2012) also
make use of the UNCTAD data, restricting themselves to the developing countries and
employing alternative estimating techniques, resulting in comparable findings. These studies
are limited, however, by their lack of bilateral FDI information, making them unable to
estimate the role of key gravity variables such as the distance between origin and destination
or shared languages. In addition, depending on the year, UNCTAD provides multilateral
data on aggregate FDI and MA (number of projects and total value), but the GF data
6See Blonigen and Piger (2011) for an overview of the standard gravity controls in FDI regressions.
7Examples of studies looking at the effect of institutions and/or financial depth on MA FDI include Rossi
and Volpin (2004), di Giovanni (2005), Hyun and Kim (2007), Hur et al. (2011), and Coeurdacier et al.
(2009). Desbordes and Wei (2014), using data on GF flows, find that both origin and destination financial
development are driving factors.
8DiGuardo et al. (2013) also find that physical, cultural and political distances reduce MA flows but
do not consider GF flows. Azemar et al. (2012) point to market familiarity (a combination bilateral ties,
experience with weak institutions, and lack of international experience) as an important factor in FDI
between developing countries.
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only becomes available in 2002. Hence in Park et al. (2012), the GF data are created
by subtracting MA flows from aggregate FDI.9 As this ignores other possible forms of FDI
changes, such as equity increases by existing projects via retained earnings, non-standardized
reporting definitions and reporting across countries, and round-tripping FDI, this is not a
clear-cut comparison between MA and GF FDI.
Despite the advantages in using bilateral data, there is very little work exploiting it.
Hebous et al. (2011) have bilateral data decomposing FDI into GF and MA for outbound
German investments. This allows them to include both distance, which impedes GF less than
MA (in contrast to Nocke and Yeaple, 2008), and the tax rate of the destination, finding that
MA is less sensitive to destination taxes than is GF. In her comparison of GF and MA FDI
across US states, Swenson (2001) finds a similar difference in tax sensitivities. These results
are consistent with the model of Becker and Fuest (2010), who indicate that tax advantages
of a particular destination are likely to be capitalized into the acquisition price, something
which would not happen with GF. Outside of these tax-oriented studies, in a comparison
between MA flows and total FDI flows (a comparison which is subject to the same caveats
as in the above work using the aggregate UNCTAD data), Klein and Rosengren (1994) find
that inbound US MA investments are marginally more sensitive to exchange rate variation
than are aggregate flows. This then lends support to the notion of “fire sale” FDI, that is,
investments which are spurred by a decline in the cost of establishing/acquiring the affiliate
due to exchange rate movements (Froot and Stein, 1991).10
Combining the above results, several overarching predictions emerge. First, we would
expect the levels of both GF and MA to respond in comparable ways to the traditional
gravity variables, i.e. levels of FDI are greater between large, wealthy countries with small
barriers between them. Second, in line with Nocke and Yeaple (2008) we anticipate that
9Neto et al. (2009) on the other hand combine MA data in values for 1996-2002 with GF data with
number of projects for 2002-2006.
10In this type of investment, coined by Krugman (2000), the firm’s intent is more driven by the ability to
acquire a investment asset while its price is low rather than the traditional motives ascribed to MA FDI.
Evidence of such behavior is found by Blonigen (1997). See also Aguiar and Gopinath (2005).
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MA (which generally originates in high-income countries) is particularly drawn to high-
income countries, both due to the availability of potential targets as well as the assignment
predictions of their model. Third, we anticipate that MA is relatively more sensitive to
destination financial depth and institutional quality. Fourth, we anticipate that distances,
be they cultural or physical, impact GF less than MA investments. Finally, we expect that
GF is more sensitive to destination taxes whereas MA is more responsive to exchange rate
shocks.
3 Data Description
In this section, we discuss our variables of interest, which measure GF and MA FDI, as well
as the control variables we use in our regression analysis. Our key variables are FDIm,o,d,s,t
which is the number projects via FDI mode m from origin country o to destination d in
sector s in year t. In order to simplify our discussion, we use the term project to mean an
investment project, that is a GF investment or a MA. The mode of the project refers to
whether it is GF, i.e. a new project that did not exist before, or MA, that is the merger with
or acquisition of a pre-existing entity. The list of the 39 sectors in our study is in Table 1.
While our sample covers the globe, in our discussion and tables we refer to specific countries.
The list of country abbreviations used is found in Table 2.
3.1 Construction of GF
Our GF data come from fDi Markets, which is a commercial database tracking the universe
of cross-border greenfield investments that covers all sectors and countries worldwide since
2003.11 The data are available at the project level, that is, an individual GF investment.
These data report the source and destination countries as well as the sector of the GF project
11This is the source of greenfield FDI data for the UNCTAD (2014) data. It can be found at http:
//www.fdimarkets.com/.
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(note that this is the sector of the project, not the parent firm undertaking the project).12
This classification is that in Table 1. Unfortunately, it does not report a measure of the
size of the investment which is comparable to those in the MA data. Further, it does not
provide us detailed information on the parent firm. Thus, we cannot utilize the data for a
meaningful study at the observation level a` la Drogendijk and Slangen (2006) and instead
aggregate these up to the origin, destination, sector, year level, making our data more similar
to that of Hebous et al. (2011). Finally, note that these projects can represent either a new
GF project in a destination country where the source firm was already active or a first time
entry into a destination.
3.2 Construction of MA
These data come from the Zephyr database, produced by Bureau van Dijk from press re-
leases.13 Zephyr claims to cover the universe of domestic and international MA projects
across the globe with a value above 1 million British pounds.14 Although the data begin in
2000 (and extend back to 1997 for the USA and European countries), here we utilize only
the data since 2003 to match the GF data. As with the GF data, these are at the project
level. Although there is more detailed information on both the acquiring firm (located in the
origin) and the target (located in the destination), without comparable information in the
GF data, these are of little use in our comparisons. In order to match the GF information,
we therefore aggregated up to the source, destination, sector, year level. In doing so, there
were two challenges.
First, the MA data report both a country name and a country code for the source and
destination. While in most cases the name and code match, there are exceptions.15 In
these cases, we used the country code to allocate a project to a particular source/destination
12As we do not have data on the sector of the parent, we cannot identify vertical versus horizontal
investments as Herger and McCorriston (2014) do for MA data.
13These can be found at http://www.bvdinfo.com.
14Note that there is no comparable size threshold in the GF data.
15In the source data, mismatches were approximately 6% of projects. For destinations, the mismatch was
about 1% of projects.
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country. In other cases, only the name or the code was reported. In this situation, we used
the available information to allocate the project. Finally, there were cases where neither the
name nor the code was reported.16 In these cases, we allocated the project to a catch-all
category (“Earth”) and these projects were then used in the below analysis when possible
(i.e. when source was missing, we were still able to use the projects when considering
destinations). We note this because in the analysis below utilizing source, destination, or
source-destination pair information, these observations could not be used.
Second, unlike the GF data, the MA sectors are classified in 4-digit SIC codes, distin-
guishing between codes of the parent and target firms. To correspond to the GF data, we
used the target industry code as the code of the project and a correspondence from fDi Mar-
kets that maps SIC codes into the GF sector classification. However, this correspondence did
not cover all SIC codes. For some, we allocated the project by matching the SIC industry’s
description and the GF sector description.17 Nevertheless, for about 6% of projects, there
was no clear-cut classification. Furthermore, the industry code was not reported for 18% of
projects. These were allocated to a catch-all sector “Miscellaneous” for which there is no
GF counterpart.
Finally, following the international standard, we included MA where a foreign firm ac-
quired a minimum of a 10% stake in the affiliate. This 10% cutoff is common across countries
in determining whether or not a foreign person has control, i.e. whether it counts as FDI.
3.3 Interpretation of the measures
Before continuing to a detailed analysis of the data, it is important to recognize what these
GF and MA measures do and do not capture. These variables measure the number of new
projects occurring between two countries in a given sector in a given year. As such, they are
flow variable, not a measure of the stock of projects. Because of this, countries that feature
16These missing information cases amounted to 15.6% for the source data and 3.5% for the destination
data.
17Details on the correspondence construction are available upon request.
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heavily in flows during the sample period (such as China) may still lag behind in their share
of accumulated investment flows. In addition, these count investments, not dis-investments,
meaning that they do not measure the net flows of projects. Furthermore, we focus here
exclusively on FDI which is by definition cross-border investment and do not include what
happens within a country. Thus, one must keep these issues in mind when interpreting the
patterns and findings below. Finally, these data are count data and do not control for the
size of the project (be that measured as employment, the value of investment, sales, or some
other measure). We are forced to do this as there does not exist a comparable measure of
size in the GF and MA datasets. Nevertheless, we endeavor to link these count measures
back to the value of capital flows below.
3.4 Control variables
In our regressions, we utilize a set of canonical control variables which are standard in FDI
analysis, including origin, destination, and pair-wise factors. Details on data sources, mea-
surements, and summary statistics are in the Appendix. Broadly speaking, these “gravity”
variables fall into two categories: market size and international barriers. For both the origin
and destinations, we use GDP and population as measures of market size. Note that as both
are in logs, including both implicitly controls for per-capita income. In addition, we include
the destination’s market potential which is intended to control for the destinations proximity
to other markets.18 For international barriers, we include a number of different measures.
The first is the World Bank’s (2014) bilateral trade cost measure which controls for the ease
of trade between the origin and destination. In addition, we use several geographic measures:
the distance between them, a dummy equalling one when they are contiguous (i.e. share a
common border), and dummy variables indicating whether the origin or destination is an
island or landlocked country. To control for cultural differences, we include a dummy equal
to one when the two countries share a common language and dummy indicating whether or
18Blonigen et al. (2007) provide discussion on this issue.
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not they share a colonial history. As another measure of barriers, we include a proxy for
destination investment costs.
Beyond these gravity variables, we utilize several measures of the political and economic
environments. For both the origin and destination, we include proxies for institutional
development, the quality of corporate governance, and to proxy for financial depth, the
extent of stock market capitalization. In addition, to examine how FDI may be affected
by exchange rate shocks, we include controls for whether or not the origin or destination
country is experiencing a currency crisis. Given the importance attributed to destination
taxes when making location decisions, we include the destination’s statutory corporate tax
rate.19 Finally, as factor price differences potentially influential for mode choice (Nocke and
Yeaple, 2008), we use the Balassa (1964) measure of revealed comparative advantage (RCA).
This measure identifies a comparative advantage in a sector s for country i if the s’s share
in i’s export basket exceeds s’s share in worldwide exports. Note that unlike our other
measures, RCA is available at the sector level, however due to trade data limitations, we
were only able to obtain measures for 28 of our sectors, most of which were in manufacturing.
This list of sectors for which RCA is available is in Table 1.
4 Stylized Facts
Before delving into the econometric analysis, it is beneficial to explore the data using simple
descriptive statistics and construct a set of stylized facts regarding the overarching patterns
in GF and MA flows. As stressed above, on the whole the two modes are often found to
behave similarly, however, even a basic analysis reveals important differences. Figure 1’s
top panel shows the evolution of GF and MA FDI over our sample period (for the moment,
simply focus on the cumulated levels). From this, three key observations can be drawn.
First, in terms of the number of projects, GF outstrips MA by nearly 50% (more on this
19Although the effective average tax rate would be more appropriate when estimating the decision of
whether or not to invest, available measures are very limited in their country coverage.
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below), with a total of 67,702 MA projects and 99,524 GF projects worldwide during our
sample. Second, both have been generally growing during the sample period. Third, in
response to the financial crisis of 2008-2009, both modes of FDI fell. This decline, however,
was much more severe for MA. On the other hand, MA flows recovered to their pre-crisis
levels by 2010 whereas GF flows remained stagnant.
Stylized Fact 1. GF accounts for roughly two-thirds of FDI activity. MA FDI fell more
sharply following the financial crisis, but also recovered more quickly.
4.1 Top Origins and Destinations
Table 3 presents the top ten origins, destinations, and origin-destination pairs in terms of
number of GF and MA projects. The most obvious feature of the origin and destination
columns is in their overlap. The same seven countries are top origins for both GF and MA.
Further, all the top origin and destination countries are developed Northern economies and,
as a group, these ten nations generate a very large share of FDI, accounting for 49.7% and
68.7% of the total MA and GF projects in the sample. Overall, of the 264 countries in the
worldwide sample, 64 are never origins for either mode with an additional 30 only being
origins for MA. Turning to the destinations, we see a similar degree of overlap between the
MA and GF countries. MA destinations are again predominantly developed (and indeed are
also typically major sources of MA flows), with China being the exception. GF recipients,
on the other hand, are more varied, with China, Russia, India and the United Arab Emirates
ranking in the top ten. As with outflows, the top ten again account for roughly half of FDI
inflows, although the GF inflows are noticeably less concentrated.
With respect to the country-pair ranking, the English speaking countries of the US,
Canada, and the UK dominate the MA results. In addition, China is a major destination,
particularly from other Asian locations and the US. Indeed, Japanese FDI in China has
received a good deal of attention (e.g. Armstrong, 2009) and Singapore is well known
financial hub that acts as an intermediary between China and the West. GF, however,
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is again more varied. Although the Anglo-Saxon countries still feature heavily as origins,
Japan is a primary source twice, whereas the destination countries cover both the major
developed economies as well as large developing nations. Finally, it is worth recognizing the
concentration in FDI flows, with these ten country pairs alone making up 14% of MA and
15% of GF FDI. Of the 59,782 possible country pairs, 53,792 never experience FDI of either
mode, 1090 only see MA, and 2522 only see GF.
Stylized Fact 2. GF and MA FDI outflows are very concentrated among Northern economies.
MA inflows are dominated by Northern countries; GF inflows are split between Northern and
Southern countries. At the bilateral level, MA flows are dominated by Anglo-Saxon coun-
try pairs and East-Asian flows towards China. GF flows, by comparison, are widely varied
both in terms of origin and destination. In all cases, however, a small number of countries
account for a large share of overall activity.
Thus, just as Nocke and Yeaple (2008) predict, Table 3 suggests that the mode of FDI
will be dependent on the level of development of the origin and destination, as well as the
interaction of the two. With this in mind, in what follows, we will frequently compare
flows between developed countries, termed North-North (NN) flows, flows from developed to
developing countries (North-South, NS), flows from developing to developed countries (SN),
and flows between developing countries (SS).20 Figure 1’s top panel shows the evolution
of these four combinations over our sample period. Unsurprisingly, the Northern countries
are the dominant origin for both modes, however, GF destinations are typically Southern
whereas MA destinations are typically Northern. By way of contrast, FDI from the South
is more concentrated in Southern destinations for both modes. As noted above, there was a
difference in the modes’ responses to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Breaking this down
into the four directions, we see that the shifts in MA flows were predominantly driven by
flows from the North to either destination. GF, however, saw most of their declines due to
falls in NS flows.
20The designations for the different countries, which follows the IMF’s classification, is found in Table 2.
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Again turning to pair-wise comparisons, Tables 4 and 5 present the top ten country pairs
for investments from the North and South respectively. As can be seen in Table 4, in terms
of origin and destination, NN MA flows are dominated by five countries: the USA, the UK,
Canada, Germany, and France. GF flows are similarly patterned, although the US-Japanese
relationship is important for this mode. For the NS flows, China features large in both GF
and MA, as do the BRICs and the US-Mexico pair. A marked difference between the NN
and NS flows is in the number of MA, with NS MA flows only a third of the NN MA flows.
GF, in contrast, is actually higher in the NS than the NN flows. For FDI from the South,
Table 5 indicates that whereas the MA flows are quite varied, GF is dominated by India
and China. In addition, for both modes, the Korean-US pair is important. For SS FDI, two
key patterns are worth pointing out. First, the top pairs are heavily Asian, with China the
dominant recipient. Second, Singapore and Malaysia are key origins for FDI. An interesting
feature is that these countries heavily invest in each other in MAs, suggesting the possibility
of complex cross-ownership patterns.
4.2 Sector Patterns
Table 1 indicates that our data include both manufacturing and services sectors. Figure 1
shows the evolution of these two broad industry categories for both modes across the four
directions. Mirroring global trends in trade and value-added, it is little surprise that services
FDI via either mode have been growing more rapidly than manufacturing FDI. Despite this,
the number of manufacturing FDI projects exceeds that in services, a difference that is much
more pronounced in GF than in MA. Other than this, however, the broad patterns in terms
of changes over time and directions of investment are on the whole similar between the two
industries.
To provide more detailed analysis, Table 6 lists the top ten sectors for GF and MA
respectively. As can be seen, even though manufacturing dominates overall FDI projects,
the top three sectors in both GF and MA are service sectors, specifically Software & IT,
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Financial, and Business services. Indeed, there is a good deal of overlap across the two
modes’ top sectors, with seven sectors placing highly for both. That said, there are also
noticeable differences. For example, whereas Textiles claim the fourth spot for GF, they do
not rank at all in MA. Likewise, Pharmaceuticals, which ranks tenth for MA does not feature
in the GF findings. It is tempting to interpret these differences as resulting from different
in the factor intensities (and thus use of intangibles) between the sectors, a difference which
feeds into the choice of mode. We will explore this notion further in our regressions where
we account for RCA.
Stylized Fact 3. Manufacturing projects outnumber services projects, particularly for GF,
nevertheless, the broad patterns are comparable for both manufacturing and services. At the
sector level, services in the IT, Business, and Financial sectors dominate both entry modes.
Other key sectors, however, vary across modes.
Table 7 lists the top ten sector for each of our direction pairs. This highlights the very
different sectoral composition of flows depending on their direction. While the top sectors
in Table 6 continue to appear frequently, their position relative to one another as well as
relative to other sectors varies as other sectors take dominance. For example, in NN MA,
Metals fall from fourth to sixth place; Pharmaceuticals, however gains four places. Looking
at NS GF, textiles now rank sixth, replaced by Food & Tobacco. Similarly, Coal, Oil, and
Natural Gas is a dominant sector for SS FDI in both modes. This variation in sectors as it
depends on country pairs is very suggestive of the importance of comparative advantage in
the determination of FDI flows as predicted by Nocke and Yeaple (2008).
Stylized Fact 4. Sector-level FDI patterns vary according the level of development of the
origin and destination with overarching patterns suggestive of comparative advantage moti-
vations. This holds for both MA and GF investment.
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4.3 Projects vs. Value of FDI
As noted above, our data indicate that most projects over the sample period took place
via GF, not MA. This appears in contrast to the accepted wisdom that most FDI is MA,
not GF.21 It must be remembered, however, that our measure is a count of the number of
projects, not their value. Although our GF and MA data contain some information on the
size of investment, they are not comparable across the two (and are missing for many MA
projects). Thus, we cannot carry out a meaningful comparison of the total magnitudes of
the two types of FDI using our data.
Nevertheless, as a step towards calculating such a value comparison, we utilized data on
net FDI inflows (in millions of US dollars) from the World Development Indicators (World
Bank, 2013) and regressed it on the number of inbound MA and GF projects in a given
destination d in year t along with a set of year dummy variables. Thus, the coefficients on
the two variables should roughly reflect the average relative value of the inflow of a particular
type of project. The results are found in Table 8. These estimates suggest that the average
MA project is valued at approximately 5.1 times that of a GF project. Taking into account
that the number of GF projects is 50% higher than the number of MA projects, this suggests
that for every dollar of FDI, about 77.5% is due to MA while the remainder is composed of
GF. While this figure must be taken with a grain of salt, although most FDI is GF in terms
of projects, the majority of FDI values are likely due to MA.22
5 Regression Findings
Although the above stylized facts suggest that different factors may matter for the two modes,
it is necessary to supplement that analysis with a more rigorous econometric investigation.
Specifically, we are interested in whether there are significant differences in the ways in which
21See, for example, Globerman and Shapiro (2004).
22In particular, recall that here we can only use our data when the destination is identified and that our
project count data include only new investments whereas the net value data include expansion of existing
investments via retained earnings and disinvestments as FDI is shut down or sold to domestic investors.
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MA and GF respond differently to the variables identified by the literature as important for
overall FDI or FDI in a single mode. Note that these control variables include both time-
invariant and time-varying variables. Furthermore, we wish to allow for differences in the
short and long run responses to time varying factors. This allows us to investigate how
transient events can influence FDI. With this in mind, we estimate the following exponential
model:
FDImodt = αmodexp((xodt − xodt) β1 +GFm · (xodt − xodt) β2)ϵmodt
αmod = exp(δ1GFm + xodtδ2 +GFm · xodtδ3 + zodδ4 +GFm · zodδ5)
where FDImodt is the number of FDI projects of mode m (MA or GF) between origin
country o and destination country d at time t and ϵmodt is a multiplicative error term.
23
Equation (2) shows that we assume that the country-pair specific effect (αmod) is a linear
function of the time-averages of our explanatory variables. Given the count data nature
of our dependent variable, and its overdispersion, we adopt a negative binomial regression
model. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level.
FDImodt depends on a set of time-varying controls xodt that includes origin, destination,
and pair-wise characteristics as discussed above. These are included on their own and in-
teracted with a dummy variable GFm which is equal to one for a GF observation and zero
otherwise, i.e. the coefficients of the interactions give the difference in response by GF and
MA. FDImodt also depends on time-invariant factors, which include the average value of the
x variables (xodt) and other time-invariant variables, zod, both of which appear on their own
and interacted with GFm. Note that by using the averages of the time-varying variables, we
are distinguishing between their long run (δs) and short run (βs) effects.24 In the tables,
23Given the exponential nature of our model, coefficients can be interpreted in terms of elasticities as in
log-linear models.
24See Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012 for a good discussion of this hybrid model which relaxes the
assumption that the between and within effects are the same for a particular variable.
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the coefficient on a variable preceded by SR and with t in its subscript corresponds to the
short-run effect. Year dummies, and their interactions with GFm, account for global year-
and mode-specific shocks. When using sector data, we also include RCA which varies by
odst and a complement of sector dummy variables as well as their interactions with GFm.
Finally, note that as the regression requires data for both the origin and destination
countries, unlike in the stylized facts, we restrict ourselves to a sub-sample of data for which
all of our controls are available.25 This leaves us with the set of 60 countries in the top panel
of Table 2 and an unbalanced panel which contains 33356 MA and 57950 GF projects, or
roughly 49% and 58% of each mode’s projects respectively.26
5.1 Baseline results
In Table 9, we present our baseline results using the full sample. The table presents four
specifications. The first specification includes only measures of market size and international
barriers. The second adds controls for the economic and political climate of the origin and
destination. The third, which is our preferred specification, further adds variables relating
to currency crises and capital market depth. In each of these, the first column presents the
coefficients for our non-interacted controls. The second column presents the coefficients for
the controls interacted with GFmodt, i.e. the estimated difference between the effect on MA
and GF with the sum of the two the estimated total effect for GF. The significance of this
total effect is indicated by the †s on the standard error of the interacted variable (something
particularly of interest when the interacted and non-interacted coefficients differ in sign).
The fourth specification uses total number of FDI projects as the dependent variable, i.e.
it does not distinguish between modes. This is included in order to compare our estimates
with those that would be obtained could we not differentiate between GF and MA.
Looking across the first three specifications, we see that the inclusion of additional vari-
25When omitting some controls, as in Specification 1, it is possible to expand the number of countries
included. Doing so yields results very comparable to what we present. Therefore, rather than have different
samples across specifications, we restrict our sample accordingly.
26Results from a balanced panel were qualitatively identical.
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ables can affect the estimates (for example, when including the political and economic vari-
ables, we no longer find differences between MA and GF responses to long run GDPs).
However rather than elaborate on these cross-specification differences, for brevity we focus
only on the estimates of the preferred specification.
Beginning with our market size variables, we find that higher origin and destination
long-run GDPs increase FDI in both modes with no significant difference between them.
Short-run increases in origin GDP also increase FDI in both modes, although the effect is
only one-third as large for GF. In contrast, short run increases in destination GDP reduce
the number of MA yet have no effect on GF. Thus, although the two modes react similarly
to persistent GDP patterns, GF is less responsive to short run variations. Similarly, higher
origin population, both in the long and short run, reduce MA activity (which given the
log form and the inclusion of GDP, is best interpreted as more MA coming from wealthier
countries as per Nocke and Yeaple, 2008). However, there is no significant impact from origin
population on GF. On the other hand, long-run destination population encourages only GF.
Since MA is in part about acquiring new technologies whereas GF is primarily about locating
the firm’s existing technology in the most profitable (i.e. low cost) location, this result may
reflect the relative attractiveness of low destination wages for GF (an interpretation that
is supported by the fact that GF is generally headed to developing countries). Short run
destination population increases are correlated with more FDI of both modes, although as
with destination GDP, the effect is muted for GF. Combining these results, the broad picture
is that FDI of both modes is attracted to larger markets, mirroring the existing literature.
Further, origin income is a driver for MA but not GF. Finally, on the whole, GF appears
less sensitive to short run variations than does MA, a result that has not been documented
to this point. Destination market potential is negatively correlated with FDI in both modes.
Although this negative coefficient is a common finding, it is not consistent with existing
models of FDI.27 This effect is twice as large for MA as GF investment. Short run boosts in
27For example, see Blonigen et al. (2007) or Davies and Guillin (forthcoming).
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market potential, however, significantly increase MA but not GF. Thus, proximity to other
markets has somewhat mixed effects. In any case, as the coefficients are quite small, our
estimates suggest that the importance of surrounding market potential is swamped by the
importance of the destination market’s size.
Turning to our trade barrier measure, we find that long run trade costs are a significant
and equal detriment to both modes. Short run variations, however, have no significant effect.
In contrast, investment costs reduce MA but have no significant effect on GF. Across our
other barrier measures, we find that GF is generally less responsive to barriers. While both
modes are deterred by the distance between countries, the effect for GF is a third smaller.
This is comparable to the finding of Hebous et al. (2011). Similarly, while a common
language boosts both modes, the effect is muted for GF. To the extent that these control
for cultural differences, this is in in line with Neto et al. (2009) and Drogendijk and Slangen
(2006). A similar finding is found for the island and landlocked variables. Contiguity has
no impact on either mode. Thus, we find that on the whole FDI is reduced by differences
in location, language, and history, but that these matter more for MA than GF investment.
This would be consistent with the notion that to reap the benefits of MA requires integration
between the acquiring firm and the target whereas GF does not.
In comparison, only GF responds to institutional quality, tending to come from countries
with strong institutions and go to locations with weaker institutions. We hesitate to suggest
that this means GF is attracted to weak institutions, however, since it may simply capture
that the predominance of GF flows to developing countries. This is one reason for con-
sidering direction-specific FDI flows. Stronger corporate governance encouraging inflows of
both modes but is negatively correlated with GF outflows (suggesting that better corporate
governance in the origin may encourage firms to locate new production facilities there rather
than offshore). Higher origin technology levels, increases both modes, particularly GF. This
again is consistent with the notion that GF must rely more on what the firm brings with it
from the origin country. Higher technology in the destination, on the other hand, reduces
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GF and MA equally.
Both modes see higher outbound flows when the origin tax is higher, a result suggestive
of investment seeking low-tax locations. In this vein, we find negative coefficients for the
destination tax variables, however, this is significant only for GF. This is consistent with
Hebous et al. (2011) and Swenson (2001) and the theory of Becker and Fuest (2010).
Turning to the crisis variables, we find that more MA comes from countries with higher
average crisis numbers but that there is no effect on GF. This may be due to investors in such
countries seeking safer investment opportunities elsewhere, leading them to purchase more
foreign assets. Both modes, however, fall when the origin country is actually experiencing a
currency crisis. Looking to the destination, the only significant effect is that inbound MA
rises during a currency crisis, a result suggestive of the fire sale argument and consistent with
the results of Blonigen (1997). Thus, as in Klein and Rosengren (1994), we find that MA is
more sensitive to exchange rate changes than is GF. Finally, greater capital market depth in
either location encourages more FDI in either mode, although the impact of origin capital
market depth on GF is half as large. This then recalls the unilateral estimates of Globerman
and Shapiro (2004). In addition, as with the other variables, although both modes increase
with a short-run increase in origin capital market depth, the effect is significantly smaller
for GF. This is in line with Baker et al. (2009), who find evidence for their “cheap finan-
cial hypothesis”, in which FDI flows reflect the opportunistic use of the relatively low-cost
financial capital available to overvalued parents in the source country.
Thus, our estimates suggest that GF and MA investments follow broadly similar patterns
but that there are noticeable differences. On the whole, GF is less responsive to international
barriers, short run market size variations, destination currency devaluations, and origin
capital market depth, but is more responsive to destination tax rates and origin technological
development.
Finally, turning to the fourth specification which uses total FDI as the dependent variable,
we unsurprisingly find a comparable overall pattern with the coefficients lying between those
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for MA and the total GF effects.
5.2 North versus South results
In Table 10, we break the sample into four sub-samples: NN, NS, SN, and SS respectively.
Thus the first two specifications relate to investment originating the developing countries
and the odd-numbered specifications describe FDI destined for the developed countries.
Beginning with the market size variables, we see that the sign of the coefficients are on the
whole comparable to those found in the baseline results. What differs considerably, however,
is the significance across sub-samples. The significance of the origin and destination GDP
and populations are higher for the NN sub-sample than in the others (despite this being by
far the smallest sample). That said, long run GDP, be that for the origin or destination, tends
to increase FDI in both modes across all sub-samples. For NN FDI, it is worth recognizing
that these effects are significantly smaller for GF than MA FDI. Recall that this is what
Globerman and Shapiro (2004) found for their entire sample of unilateral data where they
were unable to make country-pair comparisons. Further, the result from the baseline that
GF is attracted to a higher long run population (and thus lower average wage) location
seems to be a feature of GF FDI destined for the North, regardless of its origin. In contrast,
long run destination population in the South has no effect (possibly due to a greater conflict
between the attraction of low wages for employees and the repulsion of low wages of potential
consumers). For market potential, we find the opposite as it is far more significant for FDI
destined to the South than the North, regardless of the origin. Together these suggest
that country-pair markets are particularly important for FDI between developing countries
whereas proximity to third markets matters more for developing nations.
Long run trade barriers reduce FDI in all cases, although for SN FDI, this is true only
for GF. Similarly, distance, common language, and colonial history are roughly comparable
across sub-samples in sign, although the magnitude of coefficients differs somewhat. For
example, distance has a similar impact in the NS, SN, and SS sub-samples, but a much
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smaller coefficient in the NN regression.28 A second noticeable difference compared to the
baseline is that only in the SN sub-sample does GF respond differently than MA (where
as in the baseline it is less responsive to distances). Given the various concentrations in
modes across these sub-samples, this suggests that some of the differences picked up in
Table 9 may have been due to differences between NN FDI and that involving developing
countries rather than those between GF and MA. Another key difference across samples
is the importance of institutions, which matter only for FDI originating in the developed
countries. In particular, note that the puzzling negative coefficient on destination institutions
has disappeared. Instead, we find that, as one might expect, better destination institutions
attract FDI, a result that is particularly true for MA FDI between developed countries. A
common result across sub-samples is that higher levels of origin technological development
(be that origin developed or developing) is correlated with more outbound GF but not MA
FDI.
The coefficients on the tax variables also differs across the sub-samples. Higher origin
taxes are correlated with greater outflows in both modes for FDI between developing coun-
tries. In contrast, GF FDI within the developed world is negatively correlated with origin
taxes. Destination taxes are now only significant for FDI within the North. Somewhat per-
versely, it suggests that MA is actually attracted to higher destination taxes; GF, however,
remains negatively correlated with the destination tax.29
FDI from the North is where most of the significance of the currency crisis variables
are found. On the whole, they are consistent with the baseline estimates. One difference,
however, is in the SN results where during a crisis in the origin country, MA outflows sig-
nificantly increase. This is suggestive of the possibility of capital flight during such episodes
with investors in the South seeking a safe haven in the North. In a comparable fashion,
28One interpretation of this result would be that NN FDI has a greater concentration of market-seeking
horizontal FDI, a form of investment which is increasing in trade costs, whereas the others have a greater
vertical (or factor-seeking) component.
29Note that due to data availability, our dataset does not include the bulk of the tax haven countries (most
of which are developing).
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our capital market depth variables matter most for NN FDI where the findings again mirror
those in the baseline.
Combining these, we see that there are indeed differences in the patterns of FDI depending
on the number of developed countries it involves. On the whole, FDI between developed
countries (which recall is the largest share of total flows) match the baseline results. Further,
allowing the coefficients to vary according to the direction of flows reduces some of the
differences between MA and GF. However, we still find that GF is generally less sensitive to
short-run market size variation than is MA but that it is much more sensitive to destination
tax rates and origin technological development.
5.3 Sector results
Table 11 utilizes the sector information in our data. Unfortunately, finding data at the
sector level across countries and time is difficult and we are therefore limited in our ability
to include sector-level controls. Nevertheless, we examine the data in two ways.
First, specifications 1 and 2 repeat the baseline but using only manufacturing and services
projects respectively (i.e. the dependent variable in specification 1 is the number of manu-
facturing projects in mode m from o to d in t). On the whole, the estimated coefficients are
similar across industries and to the baseline estimates. Nevertheless, differences do emerge.
For example, while trade costs reduce all modes in both sectors, the impact on MA is half
as large in manufacturing as in services; GF meanwhile has a roughly comparable response
in both industries. In addition, while distance lowers both modes in both industries, we see
a relative unresponsiveness in GF manufacturing but not in GF services. Origin technology,
on the other hand increases both modes in both industries with an even stronger effect for
outbound manufacturing GF. Institutions are significant for manufacturing but not for ser-
vices; a common language however is more important for services than manufacturing. The
only significant tax coefficient is found on manufacturing GF, where as before, we find that
higher destination taxes mean less investment. Thus, we find that on the whole the two
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industries have similar patterns but that certain factors (such as destination population or
language barriers) are more important in one industry than in another, with these differences
in line with what one might expect for these broad industry categories.
Specification 3 uses data at the country-pair, mode, year, and sector level. Recall that
with these data, we augment the baseline specification by including sector dummies (includ-
ing their interactions with the GF dummy) and both long run and short run measures of
RCA. As can be seen, the coefficients are generally comparable to those in the baseline (al-
though with the rise in the number of observations, we see a rise in significance). Focusing on
the RCA variables, we see that higher long-run RCA increases both inbound and outbound
FDI in both modes, indicating a comparative advantage component to both the creation
of outbound FDI and the ability to attract it. In addition, having a stronger comparative
advantage tends to increase GF more than it does MA, again suggesting the importance of
the development of firm-specific assets at home for GF investment relative to MA. Short run
variations in comparative advantage, however, have no effect.
6 Conclusion
FDI is a dominant feature in the global economy, with intra-firm trade accounting for a third
of global trade flows (Lanz and Miroudot, 2009). One long-recognized aspect of FDI is that
it takes place for a variety of different reasons and through different modes, namely mergers
and acquisitions and greenfield investment. Nevertheless, data constraints have hindered a
systematic comparison of these two modes of investment. This paper has sought to fill that
gap.
Using worldwide data on MA and GF for 2003-2010, we find that in terms of numbers the
majority of worldwide flows are GF, although MA likely accounts for approximately 77.5%
of the value of those flows. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of investment in both modes comes from
the developed countries, with developed countries also the primary destinations for MA. In
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contrast, most GF goes to the developing world. With respect to the sectoral composition
of FDI, three sectors (Software & IT services, Business Services, and Financial Services)
dominate flows in both modes. That said, there are differences in the sectoral composition,
particularly when comparing sectors between developed and developing countries. Using
regression analysis, we find that the broad pattern of MA and GF investments are similar.
In particular, we find that both are attracted to larger markets and flourish when the bar-
riers between countries are smaller. Nevertheless, we do find differences between them. It
is important to highlight that these results are consistent with the conceptual distinction
between the two modes. In case of GF, the investing firm relies on its own capacities which
are closely related to home attributes. A MA transaction, on the other hand, involves a
transfer of ownership and an integration process and as such may exhibit more opportunis-
tic behaviour. These differences may then go hand in hand with the observation that MA are
very much a developed country phenomenon whereas developing countries are much more
represented in GF activity.
Taken as a whole, these results are reassuring in that they suggest that the current
state of understanding of FDI patterns is not overly sensitive to the distinction between
FDI modes. Nevertheless, given the differences and in particular certain countries attract
certain modes, recognizing the differences between MA and GF is potentially important
to reconciling the varying results found across different data sets. Furthermore, our results
suggest that policies intending to influence FDI may have a differential impact across modes.
For example, cutting one’s tax rates may lead to more inbound GF investment but not
additional MA. Similarly, working to upgrade the technological development of a country is
more likely to encourage outbound GF investment than MA. To the extent that these have
different impacts on an economy (see Davies and Desbordes (forthcoming) for an example),
this may be important when developing policy. Thus, although this exercise has been largely
descriptive, it makes a significant contribution in terms of our understanding of FDI and of
the sometimes contradictory literature that has been written about it.
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A Data description and sources
Our GDP measure is the log of GDP in constant 2005 US dollars. Population is the log of
population in 1000s. Both come from version 8 of the Penn-World Tables (Feenstra et al.,
2013). Distance is the log distance in kilometers between capital cities. This, along with
the common language, contiguity, and colonial history data came from the CEPII database
((Mayer and Zignago, 2006)). Market potential for a destination d in t is
∑
i ̸=d
GDPit
distid
. Landlock
and island nation status come from Wikipedia (2014b, 2014a). For trade costs, we use one
year lags of the World Bank’s Trade Costs Dataset (2014).30 This measure is constructed
from multiplying the ratio of exports from i to j relative to trade within i by the comparable
ratio for j. See Novi (2013) for details. Investment costs are constructed as ln(100− INVit)
where INVit is the investor perception index from the Heritage Foundation (2013).
31 As this
varies extremely little for a given country, we only use its average value.
The measure of country-level governance indicates how well property rights are protected
and enforced. It corresponds to the first principal component of three Worldwide Governance
Indicators, available over the 2003-2010 period: Political Stability; Rule of Law; and Control
of Corruption.32 These indicators have been constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2011) on the
basis of a weighted aggregation of governance indicators from different sources, e.g. surveys
of firms and households, subjective assessments of various organisations.33. A higher value
means better country-level governance. The measure of corporate governance indicates how
much firms’ management is accountable and transparent. It corresponds the first principal
component of the following indicators: Efficacy of corporate boards; Protection of minority
shareholder’s interests; Strength of auditing and accounting standards. These indicators
come from the 2005-2010 issues of the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Re-
port (GCR) and are based on surveys from business leaders.34 A higher value means better
corporate governance. The technology measure also comes from the GCRs and reflects the
availability of latest technologies in a given country. A higher value means that more frontier
technologies are available.
Statutory tax data come from Loretz (2008) which was supplemented with data from
KPMG (2012) when needed. As this varied little over time for the large share of our countries,
we only use the average value of its log. The currency crisis dummy variable comes from
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). A currency crisis is defined as an annual depreciation versus
the U.S. dollar (or the relevant anchor currency) of 15 percent or more. Stock market
capitalization is normalised by GDP and comes from Beck et al. (2009). Higher values
reflect a deeper financial system. Revealed comparative advantage is calculated using the
method of Balassa (1965), so that the RCA in sector s for country i in t is
Eist
Eit
Est
Et
, i.e. the
share of i’s exports that are in sector s relative to that share for the world as a whole. Data
30These are at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/trade-costs-dataset.
31These are at http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year.
32We use a principal component analysis for the governance measures because the variables constituting
these measures are highly correlated. Indeed the first principal component accounts for nearly 90% of total
variance. Details on this and all other principal component procedures are available on request.
33See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx.
34See http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness.
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on manufacturing come from CEPII (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010)); that on services is from
Francois and Pindyuk (2014). As these may be influenced by FDI, we use one year lagged
values.
Summary statistics for all variables are in Table 12.
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Figure 1: Evolution of FDI over time
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Table 1: List of sectors
Aerospace∗ Hotels & Tourism
Alternat./Renewable energy Indus. Machinery, Equip. & Tools∗
Automotive Components∗ Leisure & Entertainment
Automotive OEM∗ Medical Devices∗
Beverages∗ Metals∗
Biotechnology∗ Minerals∗
Building & Construct. Materials∗ Non-Automotive Trans. OEM
Business Machines & Equip.∗ Paper, Printing & Packaging∗
Business Services∗ Pharmaceuticals∗
Ceramics & Glass∗ Plastics∗
Chemicals∗ Real Estate
Coal, Oil and Natural Gas∗ Rubber∗
Communications∗ Semiconductors
Consumer Electronics∗ Software & IT services∗
Consumer Products∗ Space & Defence
Electronic Components∗ Textiles∗
Engines & Turbines∗ Transportation
Financial Services Warehousing & Storage
Food & Tobacco∗ Wood Products∗
Healthcare
Notes: * indicates sector used in sector-level regression.
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Table 2: List of countries and their abbreviations
Countries in regressions
Argentina (ARG) Ecuador (ECU) Kenya (KEN) Portugal (PRT)∗
Australia (AUS)∗ Egypt (EGY) Korea (KOR) Paraguay (PRY)
Austria (AUT)∗ Spain (ESP) Sri Lanka (LKA) Romania (ROM)
Belgium (BEL)∗ Finland (FIN)∗ Morocco (MAR) Russia (RUS)
Bolivia (BOL) France (FRA)∗ Mexico (MEX) Singapore (SGP)
Brazil (BRA) UK (GBR)∗ Mauritius (MUS) El Salvador (SLV)
Canada (CAN)∗ Ghana (GHA) Malaysia (MYS) Sweden (SWE)∗
Switzerland (CHE)∗ Greece (GRC)∗ Nigeria (NGA) Thailand (THA)
Chile (CHL) Hungary (HUN) Netherlands (NLD)∗ Tunisia (TUN)
China (CHN) Indonesia (IDN) Norway (NOR)∗ Turkey (TUR)
Coˆte d’Ivoire (CIV) India (IND) New Zealand (NZL)∗ USA (USA)∗
Columbia (COL) Ireland (IRL)∗ Panama (PAN) Venezuela (VEN)
Costa Rica (CRI) Iceland (ISL) Peru (PER) South Africa (ZAF)
Germany (DEU)∗ Italy (ITA)∗ Philippines (PHL) Zambia (ZMB)
Denmark (DNK)∗ Japan (JPN)∗ Poland (POL) Zimbabwe (ZWE)
Countries not in regressions
United Arab Emirates (ARE) Cyprus (CYP) Israel (ISR) Ukraine (UKR)
Bermuda (BMU) Hong Kong (HKG) Virgin Islands (VGB) Taiwan (TWN)
Cayman Islands (CYM)
Notes: * denotes a Northern country.
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Table 3: Top origin, destination and origin-destination country pairs
Top origin countries Top destination countries Top origin-destination pairs
M&A GF M&A GF M&A GF
country # country # country # country # origin dest. # origin dest. #
1 USA 10471 USA 23254 USA 6829 CHN 10770 USA GBR 1797 USA CHN 2904
2 GBR 5616 DEU 9423 GBR 5663 USA 7111 CAN USA 1548 USA GBR 2323
3 CAN 3125 GBR 8370 CHN 4453 IND 5881 USA CAN 1519 USA IND 2192
4 DEU 3004 JPN 7088 RUS 3534 GBR 5867 GBR USA 1227 JPN CHN 1736
5 FRA 2918 FRA 6178 CAN 3177 DEU 3540 USA CHN 751 GBR USA 1118
6 NLD 2580 ESP 3167 DEU 3138 FRA 3526 USA DEU 679 USA DEU 1009
7 SWE 1669 ITA 2935 FRA 2454 RUS 3524 USA FRA 563 USA CAN 983
8 JPN 1533 CHE 2742 NLD 1693 ESP 2770 HKG CHN 504 DEU USA 913
9 CHE 1400 NLD 2688 AUS 1584 ARE 2313 JPN CHN 484 USA FRA 909
10 AUS 1349 CAN 2504 ESP 1503 POL 2255 SGP CHN 394 JPN USA 847
% of Total 49.7% 68.7% 50.3% 47.8% 14.0% 15.0%
Total World 67702 World 99524 World 67702 World 99524 World 67702 World 99524
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Table 4: Top 10 origin-destination country pairs for North-North and North-South FDI flows
North-North North-South
M&A GF M&A GF
O. D. # O. D. # O. D. # O. D. #
1 USA GBR 1797 USA GBR 2323 1 USA CHN 751 USA CHN 2904
2 CAN USA 1548 GBR USA 1118 2 JPN CHN 484 USA IND 2192
3 USA CAN 1519 USA DEU 1009 3 USA IND 336 JPN CHN 1736
4 GBR USA 1227 USA CAN 983 4 USA MEX 260 DEU CHN 791
5 USA DEU 679 DEU USA 913 5 USA BRA 246 USA MEX 753
6 USA FRA 563 USA FRA 909 6 USA ISR 175 GBR CHN 622
7 FRA USA 346 JPN USA 847 7 GBR RUS 148 USA SGP 607
8 GBR DEU 346 CAN USA 591 8 DEU CHN 139 GBR IND 604
9 GBR FRA 329 USA JPN 553 9 GBR IND 139 FRA CHN 582
10 NLD BEL 302 USA AUS 524 10 USA RUS 126 JPN THA 576
Total 8656 Total 9770 Total 2804 Total 11367
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Table 5: Top 10 origin-destination country pairs for South-North and South-South FDI flows
South-North South-South
M&A GF M&A GF
O. D. # O. D. # O. D. # O. D. #
1 IND USA 247 KOR USA 194 1 HKG CHN 504 TWN CHN 495
2 ISR USA 129 IND GBR 187 2 SGP CHN 394 HKG CHN 443
3 IND GBR 118 IND USA 182 3 CYP RUS 289 KOR CHN 380
4 BMU USA 82 CHN USA 133 4 VGB HKG 258 SGP CHN 222
5 CYM USA 69 CHN DEU 121 5 CYM CHN 242 IND ARE 208
6 ZAF GBR 64 ARE GBR 120 6 SGP MYS 194 IND CHN 161
7 BMU GBR 51 ISR USA 104 7 MYS SGP 182 KOR IND 141
8 KOR USA 49 CHN GBR 86 8 CYP UKR 162 ARE IND 137
9 SGP AUS 49 IND DEU 68 9 VGB BMU 155 RUS UKR 136
10 IND DEU 46 MEX USA 63 10 HKG CYM 149 MYS CHN 132
Total 904 Total 1258 Total 2529 Total 2455
Table 6: Top 10 Sectors 2003-2010
M&A GF
rank Sector # deals sector # deals
1 Software & IT services 6571 Software & IT Services 10379
2 Financial Services 5710 Financial Services 8601
3 Business Services 5175 Business Services 7002
4 Metals 3634 Textiles 5688
5 Indus. Machinery, Equip. & Tools 3155 Food & Tobacco 5239
6 Real Estate 2467 Indus. Machinery, Equip. & Tools 4724
7 Food & Tobacco 2445 Consumer Products 4402
8 Transportation 2442 Communications 4031
9 Coal, Oil and Natural Gas 2230 Metals 3627
10 Pharmaceuticals 2076 Real Estate 3490
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Table 7: Top 10 sectors for NN, NS, SN and SS flows
North-North North-South
sector M&A sector GF sector M&A sector GF
1 Software & IT services 4150 Software & IT services 4694 Financial Services 1300 Software & IT services 4259
2 Business Services 2703 Business Services 2677 Metals 1211 Financial Services 3635
3 Indus. Mach., Equip. & Tools 1732 Textiles 2536 Business Services 1189 Business Services 3456
4 Financial Services 1432 Financial Services 2212 Software & IT services 1048 Food & Tobacco 2846
5 Pharmaceuticals 1193 Consumer Products 1759 Coal, Oil and Natural Gas 600 Indus. Mach., Equip. & Tools 2623
6 Metals 1010 Indus. Mach., Equip. & Tools 1559 Food & Tobacco 598 Textiles 2399
7 Transportation 890 Food & Tobacco 1472 Indus. Mach., Equip. & Tools 576 Metals 2085
8 Food & Tobacco 853 Communications 1216 Communications 530 Consumer Products 1998
9 Electronic Components 847 Transportation 901 Transportation 528 Communications 1831
10 Consumer Products 711 Chemicals 869 Chemicals 520 Automotive Components 1810
Total 15521 Total 19895 Total 8100 Total 26942
South-North South-South
sector M&A sector GF sector M&A sector GF
1 Financial Services 807 Financial Services 642 Financial Services 2171 Financial Services 2112
2 Software & IT services 736 Software & IT services 604 Real Estate 1239 Real Estate 1121
3 Metals 663 Communications 243 Business Services 778 Coal, Oil and Natural Gas 830
4 Business Services 505 Business Services 229 Food & Tobacco 757 Software & IT services 822
5 Coal, Oil and Natural Gas 460 Textiles 212 Metals 750 Food & Tobacco 793
6 Leisure & Entertainment 339 Transportation 199 Transportation 738 Communications 741
7 Indus. Mach., Equip. & Tools 319 Hotels & Tourism 178 Coal, Oil and Natural Gas 674 Metals 680
8 Hotels & Tourism 313 Indus. Mach., Equip. & Tools 162 Software & IT services 637 Business Services 640
9 Real Estate 288 Metals 157 Indus. Mach., Equip. & Tools 528 Textiles 541
10 Transportation 286 Electronic Components 154 Communications 502 Transportation 517
Total 4716 Total 2780 Total 8774 Total 8797
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Table 8: Value of M&A and GF
Number of M&A projects 154.1***
(27.57)
Number of GF projects 29.96**
(13.55)
Constant -778.7*
(463.1)
Observations 1550
R-squared 0.654
Notes: The dependent variable is net FDI inflows in millions of US$. Regression controls for year fixed
effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * on coefficients denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels respectively.
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Table 9: Baseline Regression
1 2 3 4
Type of FDI MA GF-MA MA GF-MA MA GF-MA Total FDI
GDPo 1.380*** 0.206*** 0.912*** -0.0768 0.774*** -0.0156 0.794***
(0.0548) (0.0484) ††† (0.0927) (0.0871) ††† (0.0907) (0.0860) ††† (0.0637)
SR.GDPot 2.402*** -1.492*** 2.657*** -1.801*** 2.050*** -1.383*** 1.213***
(0.346) (0.385) ††† (0.344) (0.402) ††† (0.359) (0.426) ††† (0.248)
GDPd 0.580*** -0.206*** 0.709*** -0.0604 0.695*** -0.0566 0.592***
(0.0491) (0.0419) ††† (0.0778) (0.0764) ††† (0.0760) (0.0755) ††† (0.0640)
SR.GDPdt -0.644* 0.791** -0.600* 0.686* -0.773** 0.768* 0.00197
(0.342) (0.378) (0.340) (0.372) (0.357) (0.395) (0.262)
Popo -0.825*** 0.0316 -0.305*** 0.280*** -0.250*** 0.246*** -0.146**
(0.0537) (0.0429) ††† (0.0926) (0.0860) (0.0916) (0.0855) (0.0632)
SR.Popot -2.316* 3.787** -3.729*** 5.510*** -3.216** 5.004*** -0.676
(1.221) (1.501) (1.259) (1.569) † (1.307) (1.598) † (1.124)
Popd -0.0488 0.326*** -0.0630 0.175** -0.0824 0.171** 0.0686
(0.0511) (0.0459) ††† (0.0831) (0.0808) (0.0794) (0.0790) (0.0687)
SR.Popdt 6.187*** -1.957 6.257*** -2.118 6.564*** -2.347 4.306***
(1.450) (1.541) ††† (1.385) (1.536) ††† (1.395) (1.540) ††† (1.049)
MktPotd -0.000500*** 0.000250*** -0.000631*** 0.000265*** -0.000643*** 0.000305*** -0.000481***
(8.01e-05) (6.99e-05) ††† (7.45e-05) (6.71e-05) ††† (7.23e-05) (6.81e-05) ††† (5.62e-05)
SR.MktPotdt 0.0179*** -0.0144* 0.0186*** -0.0151** 0.0193*** -0.0168** 0.00617
(0.00657) (0.00767) (0.00624) (0.00738) (0.00638) (0.00746) (0.00506)
Tradecostod -1.542*** -0.0298 -1.082*** -0.0973 -0.983*** -0.122 -1.187***
(0.122) (0.112) ††† (0.121) (0.112) ††† (0.118) (0.110) ††† (0.0906)
SR.Tradecostodt 0.107 0.103 0.0713 0.193 0.0326 0.266 0.248
(0.219) (0.257) (0.200) (0.234) (0.199) (0.232) †† (0.200)
InvestCostd -0.130 0.200*** -0.0964 0.192** -0.162** 0.208*** -0.0485
(0.0860) (0.0735) (0.0771) (0.0752) (0.0784) (0.0777) (0.0638)
Distod -0.416*** 0.138** -0.606*** 0.191*** -0.683*** 0.223*** -0.625***
(0.0545) (0.0547) ††† (0.0550) (0.0551) ††† (0.0538) (0.0545) ††† (0.0455)
Contigod 0.0808 -0.132 0.137 -0.107 0.131 -0.0863 0.0948
(0.156) (0.125) (0.139) (0.108) (0.136) (0.106) (0.116)
CommLangod 1.104*** -0.326*** 0.988*** -0.215** 0.929*** -0.201** 1.029***
(0.111) (0.0937) ††† (0.0962) (0.0877) ††† (0.0945) (0.0855) ††† (0.0790)
Colonyod 0.467*** -0.00284 0.569*** -0.0525 0.495*** -0.0238 0.460***
(0.139) (0.117) ††† (0.128) (0.114) ††† (0.120) (0.109) ††† (0.123)
Islando 0.258*** -0.193*** 0.134* -0.147** 0.167** -0.132** 0.248***
(0.0709) (0.0709) (0.0699) (0.0673) (0.0676) (0.0667) (0.0615)
Islandd -0.0586 0.197** -0.378*** 0.240*** -0.391*** 0.253*** -0.265***
(0.102) (0.0824) (0.0901) (0.0837) † (0.0843) (0.0804) † (0.0675)
Landlocko -0.259** 0.593*** -0.307*** 0.415*** -0.304*** 0.444*** -0.0344
(0.117) (0.105) ††† (0.115) (0.105) (0.115) (0.102) (0.0956)
Landlockd -0.0183 0.574*** -0.122 0.504*** -0.0648 0.498*** 0.239***
(0.117) (0.114) ††† (0.112) (0.108) ††† (0.114) (0.110) ††† (0.0922)
Insitutionso -0.0201 0.356*** 0.111 0.267*** 0.207***
(0.0903) (0.0832) ††† (0.0861) (0.0812) ††† (0.0650)
Insitutionsd 0.0670 -0.135** 0.0711 -0.145** -0.0175
(0.0666) (0.0661) (0.0639) (0.0646) (0.0548)
CorpGovo 0.172*** -0.348*** 0.0425 -0.288*** -0.161***
(0.0553) (0.0473) ††† (0.0504) (0.0446) ††† (0.0387)
CorpGovd 0.229*** 0.0139 0.183*** 0.0174 0.175***
(0.0459) (0.0436) ††† (0.0471) (0.0456) ††† (0.0379)
Techo 0.541*** 0.191** 0.316*** 0.311*** 0.623***
(0.105) (0.0896) ††† (0.103) (0.0903) ††† (0.0775)
Techd -0.459*** 0.0472 -0.475*** 0.0513 -0.403***
(0.103) (0.0920) ††† (0.0998) (0.0911) ††† (0.0777)
Taxo -0.110 0.148 0.371** -0.0393 0.379***
(0.145) (0.153) (0.150) (0.163) ††† (0.114)
Taxd -0.442*** -0.440*** -0.260 -0.456*** -0.469***
(0.152) (0.145) ††† (0.158) (0.153) ††† (0.115)
Cur.Crisiso 1.444*** -0.205 1.208***
(0.337) (0.331) ††† (0.290)
SR.Cur.Crisisot -0.105** -0.00578 -0.127***
(0.0448) (0.0545) ††† (0.0373)
Cur.Crisisd -0.293 -0.204 -0.580**
(0.356) (0.334) † (0.273)
SR.Cur.Crisisdt 0.189*** -0.219*** 0.0606
(0.0490) (0.0600) (0.0420)
Capitalo 0.634*** -0.265*** 0.518***
(0.0558) (0.0563) ††† (0.0487)
SR.Capitalot 0.326*** -0.191* 0.224***
(0.0962) (0.105) ††† (0.0638)
Capitald 0.203*** -0.00523 0.195***
(0.0597) (0.0593) ††† (0.0463)
SR.Capitaldt 0.0222 0.0505 0.0860*
(0.0576) (0.0741) (0.0460)
Constant -13.68*** -7.091*** -12.95*** -7.237*** -10.71*** -8.769*** -13.34***
(1.622) (1.493) (1.868) (1.927) (1.835) (1.879) (1.486)
α 0.0685 -0.206*** -0.287*** 0.197***
(0.0437) (0.0423) (0.0437) (0.0443)
Observations 42,994 42,994 42,994 21,497
Notes: ***, **, and * on coefficients denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Analogously †††, †††, and ††† on GF standard
errors denote whether sum of the two coefficients differs from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors reported in
the parentheses are clustered at country pair level. Variable names preceded by ”SR” correspond to deviations from average of a given variable,
i.e. the short run effect. All specifications include year dummies (including interactions with the GF dummy).
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Table 10: Results for Direction Sub-samples
NN NS SN SS
Type of FDI MA GF-MA MA GF-MA MA GF-MA MA GF-MA
GDPo 1.782*** -0.792*** 0.464 0.0603 1.227*** -0.202 0.756*** 0.210
(0.306) (0.227) ††† (0.315) (0.316) †† (0.223) (0.247) ††† (0.196) (0.202) †††
SR.GDPot 2.254** -1.173 0.0929 0.798 0.824 0.783 1.085 -0.335
(0.934) (1.196) (1.580) (1.696) (0.891) (1.020) ††† (0.835) (0.938) †
GDPd 1.126*** -1.060*** 0.905*** -0.0422 2.390*** -2.372** 0.564*** -0.0384
(0.292) (0.271) (0.148) (0.139) ††† (0.845) (0.924) (0.170) (0.186) †††
SR.GDPdt 0.716 -2.382* -0.894* 1.416*** 1.323 -0.475 0.788 -1.547
(1.073) (1.332) † (0.495) (0.527) †† (3.207) (3.621) (0.917) (1.028)
Popo -1.245*** 1.063*** 0.296 0.0652 -0.245 0.109 -0.251* 0.152
(0.311) (0.228) (0.326) (0.325) (0.164) (0.186) (0.144) (0.149)
SR.Popot -5.523*** 9.538*** 2.420 -0.286 -8.562*** 7.640* 0.293 -1.126
(1.557) (2.123) ††† (2.409) (2.705) (3.253) (4.420) (3.477) (4.074)
Popd -0.705** 1.357*** -0.0548 -0.0368 -1.681** 2.473*** 0.0627 0.131
(0.296) (0.273) †† (0.135) (0.120) (0.846) (0.919) (0.161) (0.182)
SR.Popdt 4.232** -1.242 9.358*** -4.136** 2.153 1.579 6.584* -3.218
(1.961) (2.420) †† (2.004) (2.110) ††† (6.223) (8.337) (3.464) (3.769) †
MktPotd -0.000168 -0.000382*** -0.000789*** 0.000686*** -0.000308 0.000118 -0.000628*** 0.000659***
(0.000145) (0.000122) ††† (0.000177) (0.000134) (0.000249) (0.000268) (0.000214) (0.000236)
SR.MktPotdt -0.0112 0.00528 0.0343*** -0.0145 0.0456** -0.0393* 0.0255 -0.0648**
(0.00720) (0.00992) (0.0109) (0.0120) ††† (0.0181) (0.0237) (0.0277) (0.0304) †††
Tradecostod -1.343*** 0.447*** -0.815*** 0.0199 -0.279 -0.853** -0.926*** -0.172
(0.234) (0.142) ††† (0.206) (0.183) ††† (0.285) (0.364) ††† (0.257) (0.281) †††
SR.Tradecostodt 0.0336 -0.0165 -0.257 1.008** 0.921 -0.932 0.167 -0.692
(0.116) (0.160) (0.412) (0.445) ††† (0.627) (0.899) (0.847) (0.911)
InvestCostd -0.0450 -0.00996 -0.357 1.052*** -0.833*** 0.316 -0.664* 0.00843
(0.106) (0.0944) (0.274) (0.251) ††† (0.201) (0.238) ††† (0.389) (0.399) ††
Distod -0.283*** 0.0303 -0.775*** 0.123 -1.006*** 0.552** -0.992*** 0.0374
(0.0884) (0.0657) ††† (0.138) (0.108) ††† (0.160) (0.220) †† (0.135) (0.156) †††
Contigod 0.0749 -0.0262 0.305 -0.266 0.154 -0.242 0.0736 0.0117
(0.155) (0.106) (0.466) (0.314) (0.293) (0.343) (0.194) (0.192)
CommLangod 0.655*** -0.207** 0.860*** -0.160 0.999*** 0.231 1.296*** -0.220
(0.116) (0.103) ††† (0.152) (0.134) ††† (0.211) (0.249) ††† (0.193) (0.191) †††
Colonyod 0.614*** -0.177 0.446** 0.0806 0.574** -0.136 -1.423** 0.845
(0.115) (0.114) ††† (0.193) (0.152) ††† (0.228) (0.263) † (0.718) (1.083)
Islando 0.0804 -0.0603 -0.129 -0.0778 0.356* 0.0431 0.342* -0.174
(0.0959) (0.0766) (0.102) (0.0925) ††† (0.206) (0.317) (0.193) (0.230)
Islandd -0.0366 0.0456 -0.420*** 0.594*** -0.128 0.348 -0.00211 -0.282
(0.157) (0.148) (0.149) (0.146) (0.342) (0.388) (0.216) (0.227) †
Landlocko -0.731*** 0.463*** -0.124 0.251 0.703 -0.297 -0.468 0.551
(0.140) (0.117) ††† (0.190) (0.175) (0.506) (0.542) (0.540) (0.433)
Landlockd -0.247* 0.754*** -0.137 0.820*** 0.445 0.402 -0.521 0.400
(0.139) (0.152) ††† (0.215) (0.187) ††† (0.285) (0.357) ††† (0.364) (0.412)
Insitutionso 0.913*** -0.300* 0.414* 0.201 -0.255 0.137 0.136 0.00181
(0.255) (0.181) ††† (0.232) (0.230) ††† (0.253) (0.278) (0.168) (0.189)
Insitutionsd 0.487** -0.758*** 0.257** 0.0842 0.0251 -0.174 0.0629 -0.0482
(0.199) (0.195) (0.123) (0.115) ††† (0.506) (0.549) (0.163) (0.178)
CorpGovo -0.375*** -0.0416 0.0470 -0.345*** 0.315** -0.690*** 0.256** -0.423***
(0.105) (0.0766) ††† (0.108) (0.103) ††† (0.147) (0.148) ††† (0.128) (0.130) ††
CorpGovd 0.0336 0.224*** 0.0901 -0.00598 0.0829 0.228 0.117 0.260*
(0.0839) (0.0721) ††† (0.0856) (0.0840) (0.171) (0.196) †† (0.138) (0.143) †††
Techo 0.158 0.566*** -0.261* 0.676*** 0.472** 0.469* 0.144 0.728***
(0.135) (0.109) ††† (0.155) (0.142) ††† (0.235) (0.241) ††† (0.217) (0.250) †††
Techd -0.588*** 0.400** -0.504** 0.190 -0.761 0.0803 -0.480* -0.567**
(0.165) (0.165) (0.239) (0.215) † (0.488) (0.562) † (0.289) (0.285) †††
Taxo 0.193 -0.609*** -0.451* -0.0509 0.135 0.259 0.974** 0.0723
(0.256) (0.234) †† (0.266) (0.290) †† (0.664) (0.783) (0.496) (0.535) †††
Taxd 1.450*** -2.200*** -0.0635 0.306 0.352 0.0124 0.283 0.0583
(0.359) (0.324) ††† (0.396) (0.351) (0.784) (0.967) (0.486) (0.505)
Cur.Crisiso 2.101*** -0.0440 0.0236 0.395 -0.490 1.345 0.759 0.261
(0.532) (0.459) ††† (0.526) (0.482) (1.504) (1.430) (0.736) (0.773) †
SR.Cur.Crisisot -0.211*** 0.133** -0.137* -0.000395 0.929*** -0.993*** -0.527** 0.456
(0.0479) (0.0661) (0.0813) (0.0922) ††† (0.207) (0.252) (0.261) (0.290)
Cur.Crisisd 2.574*** 0.374 -2.164* 0.627 -2.623* 3.987** -1.647* 1.573
(0.688) (0.623) ††† (1.132) (0.904) †† (1.380) (1.836) (0.986) (1.017)
SR.Cur.Crisisdt 0.168*** -0.217*** 0.432*** -0.468*** 0.333** -0.194 0.117 -0.321
(0.0508) (0.0706) (0.151) (0.178) (0.152) (0.173) (0.309) (0.337)
Capitalo 0.523*** -0.246*** 0.622*** -0.304*** 0.800*** -0.129 0.425*** 0.0647
(0.0771) (0.0669) ††† (0.100) (0.0909) ††† (0.228) (0.283) ††† (0.147) (0.155) †††
SR.Capitalot 0.196* -0.0342 0.156 0.0672 0.356* -0.150 0.347** -0.422*
(0.118) (0.137) †† (0.192) (0.204) ††† (0.187) (0.234) (0.176) (0.217)
Capitald 0.703*** -0.541*** 0.0931 0.194** 0.566** -0.279 0.103 -0.121
(0.105) (0.0934) † (0.0912) (0.0920) ††† (0.226) (0.287) (0.124) (0.140)
SR.Capitaldt -0.112 0.410*** 0.0709 -0.0709 0.389 -0.389 0.122 -0.0808
(0.0819) (0.113) ††† (0.0955) (0.120) (0.237) (0.361) (0.159) (0.184)
Constant -26.75*** 10.42** -11.23*** -13.81*** -43.78*** 24.74* -1.536 -13.79***
(5.332) (4.727) (3.705) (3.654) (11.95) (13.23) (4.390) (4.740)
α -1.094*** -0.698*** -0.348** 0.0238
(0.0798) (0.0819) (0.173) (0.114)
Observations 6,322 10,052 11,144 15,476
Notes: ***, **, and * on coefficients denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Analogously †††, †††, and ††† on GF standard
errors denote whether sum of the two coefficients differs from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors reported in
the parentheses are clustered at country pair level. Variable names preceded by ”SR” correspond to deviations from average of a given variable,
i.e. the short run effect. All specifications include year dummies (including interactions with the GF dummy).
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Table 11: Results for Sectors
Manufacturing Services Sectors
Type of FDI MA GF-MA MA GF-MA MA GF-MA
GDPo 0.776*** -0.0936 0.686*** 0.130 0.925*** -0.157
(0.106) (0.106) ††† (0.126) (0.123) ††† (0.120) (0.108) †††
SR.GDPot 2.349*** -1.491*** 1.342*** -1.057* 2.393*** -1.559***
(0.459) (0.560) ††† (0.512) (0.569) (0.402) (0.526) †††
GDPd 0.587*** 0.116 0.708*** -0.180* 0.724*** 0.0344
(0.0926) (0.0912) ††† (0.107) (0.107) ††† (0.0893) (0.0848) †††
SR.GDPdt -0.827* 0.797 -0.454 0.397 -0.743** 0.453
(0.428) (0.487) (0.421) (0.481) (0.355) (0.403)
Popo -0.220** 0.280*** -0.159 0.155 -0.421*** 0.390***
(0.106) (0.105) (0.131) (0.127) (0.126) (0.110)
SR.Popot -2.940* 2.296 -2.901 7.439*** -2.871** 3.688**
(1.663) (1.995) (1.974) (2.362) ††† (1.268) (1.710)
Popd 0.116 -0.0487 -0.127 0.285** -0.0953 0.103
(0.0937) (0.0911) (0.110) (0.112) † (0.0899) (0.0893)
SR.Popdt 4.264*** -1.345 6.297*** -1.008 5.869*** -0.786
(1.635) (1.883) ††† (1.635) (1.883) ††† (1.281) (1.482) †††
MktPotd -0.000578*** 0.000294*** -0.000506*** 0.000255*** -0.000525*** 0.000274***
(9.16e-05) (8.57e-05) ††† (9.18e-05) (8.86e-05) ††† (8.82e-05) (8.07e-05) †††
SR.MktPotdt 0.0206*** -0.0158* 0.00343 -0.0107 0.0131** -0.00918
(0.00801) (0.00940) (0.00835) (0.00988) (0.00605) (0.00743)
Tradecostod -0.688*** -0.464*** -1.123*** 0.145 -0.848*** -0.172
(0.144) (0.134) ††† (0.155) (0.144) ††† (0.137) (0.127) †††
SR.Tradecostodt 0.303 0.0943 0.0921 -0.160 0.118 0.145
(0.191) (0.250) †† (0.221) (0.254) (0.134) (0.202) ††
InvestCostd -0.146 0.235** -0.0567 0.0723 -0.0437 0.197**
(0.0902) (0.0917) (0.0986) (0.0969) (0.0942) (0.0957) ††
Distod -0.671*** 0.308*** -0.583*** 0.0800 -0.591*** 0.273***
(0.0648) (0.0640) ††† (0.0677) (0.0680) ††† (0.0631) (0.0584) †††
Contigod 0.128 -0.0813 0.0536 -0.150 -0.0319 -0.0129
(0.141) (0.126) (0.180) (0.140) (0.134) (0.113)
CommLangod 0.706*** -0.306*** 1.088*** -0.150 0.893*** -0.489***
(0.107) (0.102) ††† (0.115) (0.103) ††† (0.101) (0.0903) †††
Colonyod 0.342*** 0.0177 0.663*** 0.0414 0.347*** 0.121
(0.130) (0.129) ††† (0.133) (0.119) ††† (0.113) (0.0999) †††
Islando 0.0433 -0.0648 0.200** -0.231*** 0.0258 -0.0588
(0.0762) (0.0747) (0.0892) (0.0846) (0.0713) (0.0754)
Islandd -0.477*** 0.249*** -0.302*** 0.187* -0.367*** 0.237**
(0.101) (0.0948) ††† (0.107) (0.110) (0.104) (0.0948)
Landlocko -0.309*** 0.373*** -0.394** 0.551*** -0.311** 0.417***
(0.119) (0.115) (0.164) (0.129) (0.129) (0.120)
Landlockd -0.0403 0.615*** -0.178 0.430*** 0.0312 0.477***
(0.127) (0.140) ††† (0.157) (0.125) †† (0.121) (0.121) †††
Insitutionso 0.180* 0.408*** 0.109 0.122 0.0141 0.452***
(0.0993) (0.103) ††† (0.116) (0.112) ††† (0.105) (0.0970) †††
Insitutionsd 0.243*** -0.359*** 0.108 -0.0778 0.125 -0.255***
(0.0768) (0.0747) †† (0.0863) (0.0865) (0.0768) (0.0784) †
CorpGovo 0.00530 -0.413*** 0.0566 -0.0512 0.0899 -0.384***
(0.0557) (0.0554) ††† (0.0683) (0.0591) (0.0554) (0.0551) †††
CorpGovd 0.158*** 0.0827 0.217*** -0.0766 0.212*** 0.0165
(0.0573) (0.0581) ††† (0.0589) (0.0562) ††† (0.0567) (0.0541) †††
Techo 0.319*** 0.368*** 0.452*** -0.0419 0.295*** 0.341***
(0.110) (0.103) ††† (0.137) (0.119) ††† (0.109) (0.103) †††
Techd -0.580*** 0.139 -0.474*** 0.0685 -0.623*** 0.266**
(0.124) (0.119) ††† (0.126) (0.118) ††† (0.119) (0.110) †††
Taxo 0.314 0.237 0.235 -0.290 0.485** -0.108
(0.196) (0.199) ††† (0.206) (0.222) (0.189) (0.194) ††
Taxd 0.0602 -0.920*** -0.332 -0.272 -0.0119 -0.933***
(0.186) (0.189) ††† (0.215) (0.193) ††† (0.202) (0.182) †††
Cur.Crisiso 1.240*** -0.181 2.254*** -1.311*** 1.233*** -0.361
(0.392) (0.414) ††† (0.439) (0.426) ††† (0.388) (0.392) †††
SR.Cur.Crisisot -0.115* -0.0608 -0.116* 0.108 -0.0748* -0.0219
(0.0591) (0.0706) ††† (0.0660) (0.0768) (0.0427) (0.0541) †††
Cur.Crisisd -0.241 -0.188 0.0919 -0.468 0.420 -1.051***
(0.416) (0.416) (0.523) (0.477) (0.427) (0.406)
SR.Cur.Crisisdt 0.0971 -0.201*** 0.183*** -0.116 0.112*** -0.183***
(0.0606) (0.0733) †† (0.0691) (0.0857) (0.0434) (0.0541) ††
LR.Capitalo 0.600*** -0.270*** 0.636*** -0.279*** 0.519*** -0.320***
(0.0638) (0.0662) ††† (0.0764) (0.0738) ††† (0.0636) (0.0610) †††
SR.Capitalot 0.418*** -0.283** 0.359** -0.161 0.226** -0.119
(0.112) (0.130) †† (0.155) (0.163) ††† (0.0997) (0.116) †
LR.Capitald 0.260*** -0.0872 0.197*** 0.0660 0.266*** -0.104
(0.0678) (0.0726) ††† (0.0742) (0.0724) ††† (0.0685) (0.0696) †††
SR.Capitaldt -0.0388 0.0919 -0.0596 0.151 -0.0404 0.0826
(0.0764) (0.0957) (0.0885) (0.111) (0.0564) (0.0676)
RCAo 0.0845*** 0.0367***
(0.00677) (0.00651) †††
SR.RCAot -0.00227 0.000818
(0.00631) (0.00717)
RCAd 0.0596*** 0.0118*
(0.00671) (0.00661) †††
SR.RCAdt 0.00871 -0.00636
(0.00788) (0.0100)
Constant -13.74*** -7.595*** -13.56*** -6.926*** -19.75*** -8.135***
(2.214) (2.249) (2.464) (2.555) (2.351) (2.233)
α -0.236*** -0.103 0.878***
(0.0533) (0.0629) (0.0675)
Observations 42,994 42,994 1,166,798
Notes: ***, **, and * on coefficients denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Analogously †††, †††, and †††
on GF standard errors denote whether sum of the two coefficients differs from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses are clustered at country pair level for the Manufacturing and Services results, at
the country pair-sector level for the Sector level results. Variable names preceded by ”SR” correspond to deviations from average of
a given variable, i.e. the short run effect. All specifications include year dummies (including interactions with the GF dummy).
Sector regression also includes sector dummies (including interactions with the GF dummy).
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Table 12: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GFijt 42994 2.695725 13.71434 0 430
MAijt 42994 1.551658 8.709627 0 314
GDPo 42994 19.43607 1.628252 15.04593 23.27937
SR.GDPot 42994 2.96e-17 .0970384 -.4428279 .4682288
GDPd 42994 19.47303 1.63979 15.08686 23.2658
SR.GDPdt 42994 -6.53e-17 .093591 -.3676743 .3888025
Popo 42994 10.10888 1.504495 5.695503 14.08848
SR.Popot 42994 3.10e-17 .0267739 -.1150403 .1207413
Popd 42994 10.1105 1.494317 5.695657 14.08793
SR.Popdt 42994 4.79e-17 .0265176 -.0966141 .1054358
MktPotd 42994 11177.39 530.0359 10096.73 12069.33
SR.MktPotdt 42994 1.81e-14 60.19517 -131.9535 115.418
Tradecostod 42994 5.111146 .5596963 1.958472 7.382873
SR.Tradecostodt 42994 -2.64e-18 .1071051 -3.438952 1.120771
InvestCostd 42994 3.566004 .5369865 2.129298 4.553877
Distod 42994 8.746771 .84317 5.080959 9.885839
Contigod 42994 .0326557 .1777359 0 1
CommLangod 42994 .133414 .3400255 0 1
Colonyod 42994 .0290273 .167885 0 1
Islando 42994 .1892822 .3917372 0 1
Islandd 42994 .1826301 .3863675 0 1
Landlocko 42994 .1030842 .3040723 0 1
Landlockd 42994 .110434 .3134336 0 1
Insitutionso 42994 .5912367 1.562967 -2.372874 3.058348
Insitutionsd 42994 .4931945 1.800012 -2.994539 3.331263
CorpGovo 42994 .8714713 1.602452 -2.786992 3.587971
CorpGovd 42994 .7683506 1.6415 -3.013953 3.463763
Techo 42994 4.917824 .9665921 2.94 6.53
Techd 42994 4.963463 .9619893 2.94 6.53
Taxo 42994 -1.283333 .233419 -2.302585 -.8729639
Taxd 42994 -1.275486 .227616 -2.302585 -.8808053
Cur.Crisiso 42994 .0895009 .1163757 0 1
SR.Cur.Crisisot 42994 4.61e-18 .2606704 -.8333333 .875
Cur.Crisisd 42994 .0828953 .1036639 0 1
SR.Cur.Crisisdt 42994 3.96e-18 .255498 -.8333333 .875
LR.Capitalo 42994 3.821017 .8711386 -1.473628 5.529103
SR.Capitalot 42994 6.97e-19 .3840448 -2.330448 1.784027
LR.Capitald 42994 3.839599 .8725051 -1.473628 5.496168
SR.Capitaldt 42994 9.86e-18 .380175 -2.239944 1.749539
RCAo 1166798 1.131989 2.527801 .0001215 53.12627
SR.RCAot 1166798 -1.52e-18 .8406274 -29.68491 47.1664
RCAd 1166798 1.141948 2.515664 .0002209 82.6777
SR.RCAdt 1166798 1.87e-19 .8796243 -32.99873 40.14488
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